Two potentially competing trading blocs are being negotiated between countries of the Asia Pacific to boost world trade in the absence of progress with the Doha Round of World Trade Organization negotiations. One is the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPP) in which all negotiating parties are also members of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). This paper outlines the two proposals and discusses some of the expectations of the negotiating parties. It is clear that the TPP concept has led to a number of concerns being raised by the negotiating parties, invitee countries, and external parties including those with vested interests in the outcome of these negotiations. The RCEP concept which is essentially a large multi-lateral free trade agreement raises less concern. The paper then discusses the dilemma facing Thailand which for centuries has been a trading nation and was a founding member of the World Trade Organization. Subsequently Thailand has negotiated a number of bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements. As a leading member of Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Thailand has sought to engage in free trade agreements with its ASEAN neighbours and their external trading partners.
considers that it has the required processes in place to meet the requirements of membership.
The other major regional proposal is the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) being promoted by ASEAN for economic cooperation between the ten countries of ASEAN plus a further six countries namely China, Japan, India, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand who have, or are negotiating, Free Trade Agreements with ASEAN. This trading block would be based on 3 billion people, combined GDP of around $US 17 trillion and financial credit of around 40% of world trade. It currently excludes the United States but includes China.
There is a third regional organisation that includes both the United States and China but it is not a Free Trade Agreement. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is a grouping of 21 economies and is not a trading bloc. APEC uses the word 'economies' to describe its members because "the APEC cooperative process is predominantly concerned with trade and economic issues, with members engaging with one another as economic entities". 7 The implications for regional trade from these proposals are very significant for all parties in the Asia Pacific Region. The key question to be addressed is: should a country join TPP, RCEP, both or neither?
In this paper the focus will be on the background of TPP and the perceived benefits of membership. It will discuss some of the issues of sovereignty and extra-territoriality as the agreement moves from a purely economic agreement to one that includes much greater implications. It will then discuss the alternative concept of the RCEP which is planned as a conventional Free Trade Agreement.
Finally this paper will discuss whether or not Thailand should be party to the TPP negotiations as well as to those of the RCEP and the implications if it decides to reject the invitation to the TPP negotiating table.
Background to the TPP
The Asia-Pacific is home to a growing number of Free-Trade Agreements which differ widely in design, scope and purpose. 8 This has the potential to lead to an increase in costs for both businesses and the various governments as they struggle with the dense and conflicting complex web of conflicting rules. Each FTA sets up its own set of rules. Whilst the minimum standard required requirement is that WTO members abide by WTO rules, the additional benefits provided to the negotiating parties vary from agreement to agreement as each party seeks to gain the maximum advantage from the negotiations. They become even more complex as the parties to the agreement seek to take advantage of the agreements that the negotiating parties may have with a third country. For example if Australia exports car components directly to a country they may be subject to high tariffs and or quotas but if they are exported to Thailand at zero tariff and they can be incorporated into a vehicle in Thailand which is then exported to a third country at a preferential tariff there is a benefit to Australian manufacturers.
Interest from the international community in the TPP was sparked at the end of 2009 when the United States President (Barack Obama) announced support for a high-standard regional agreement in Asia-Pacific.
The TPP concept was first discussed on the side-lines of APEC at Mexico in 2002. TPP is a comprehensive agreement purposed to eliminate around 11,000 tariff lines when it authorised. 9 Moreover, the negotiations also cover other issues like trade in goods, rules of origin, trade remedies, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, technical barriers either trade barrier (TB) or non-trade barrier (NTB), trade in services, IP, government procurement and competition policy. 10 The USA showed an interest in TPP when President George W. Bush announced that they would join the negotiation process in 2008. Later Australia, Peru and Vietnam announced their intention to join the negotiations followed by Malaysia in 2010. Canada and Mexico joined the negotiations in 2012 with Japan joining in early 2013. The TPP has twelve countries at this stage with South Korea, China, Philippines and Indonesia considering whether or not there are benefits in joining TPP. It is possible that Taiwan will also agree to join TPP.
Of all of the ASEAN countries 11 who are also members of APEC 12 all except Thailand have elected to enter into negotiations. Other members of APEC who have not notified their intention to join TPP include Russia, Hong Kong, and Papua New Guinea.
Capling and Ravenhill consider that there are number of distinctive features of the TPP including the fact that it is 'trans-regional' in that it aims to link countries in four different regions in the Asia-Pacific. It is seen as an important means of keeping the United States in the region. 13 It aims to go beyond conventional trade access negotiations to address domestic regulatory policies that have an impact on trade and investment. Finally they see it as a means to untangle the complex bilateral agreements by becoming multilateral. As mentioned above FTAs between WTO members are required to adopt the WTO rules as the basic requirement. The negotiating parties then seek to obtain preferential treatment from the bilateral agreement which may also provide preferential third country access. Two countries may each have an FTA with a third country but the conditions may be quite different. As more bilateral agreements become negotiated the more complex becomes the situation.
Unsurprisingly, the parties to the TPP negotiations have different negotiating priorities. The United States has given the strongest to support the TPP. It hosted 19th Anniversary TPP conference in Hawaii. TPP appears to be a new trade strategy of the US as it struggles to promote its exports. Also some observers see it as a United States attempt to balance Chinese power in this region.
14 TPP is also a potential threat to ASEAN. As the result of this Thailand, who is a very active member of ASEAN, is most concerned about the impact of the TPP on ASEAN. The most likely impact, if the TPP is successful with the United States acting as a key promoter, is the degeneration of ASEAN. This will give even greater power to the United States which is likely to work in its own interests rather than to the wider community including ASEAN.
The potential impact of the TPP can be considered in two important dimensions, that is, economic and political aspects.
Economy
If all of the countries who have declared their intention to join, or are considering entering negotiations to join, the TPP at the current time do in fact unite in joining TPP (including China), the TPP will become the most important economic cooperation organisation in the world. Together, the members of the TPP would generate half of global GDP and the volume of trade would be around 1/3rd of global Trade. At this time the GDP in TPP is US$16,968 trillion (2010), GDP per capita is US $33,546 (2010) and the population of country members is 505.8 million (2010). 15 According to US information it is believed that TPP will drive the economic growth to nearly 60% of global GDP and will increase to 50% of international trade. 16 Therefore Asia-Pacific will become the largest market in the world.
The aims of the TPP appear to be similar to APEC. Even though there is much cooperation within APEC, the member countries are still trying to create a closer and higher level of cooperation. Some are concerned it might be repetitive cooperation but APEC has quite a number of members and progress is slow. Even bilateral cooperation is facing problems where local communities are concerned that their country has no power to bargain with a more powerful partner. The most significant difference between TPP and APEC is APEC is only an economic cooperation forum 17 where members are not bound by an agreement. In contrast the members of TPP have to enter into a binding agreement. The APEC agenda is transparent 18 whilst the negotiations surrounding the TPP are in secret.
The United States, which is actively promoting TPP believes TPP will be an instrument to solve its current economic crisis especially for unemployment. For the United States, compared with other Free Trade Agreements that the United States has made with 20 countries 19 the TPP has a much greater scale in relation to trade as the current FTAs are limited by the trade partners.
Moreover the US aims to promote capital fund free movement and enforcement of intellectual property law and human rights. Interestingly, China, and South Korea are still considering their position. Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam have signed as they desire to export more to the US because the United States market is one of the most important consumer markets in the world.
There is a major concern that the current TPP negotiations could have major impact on the public health and medicine policies if the views of the US pharmaceutical industries in relation to patents and generic medicines are implemented. Not only would developing countries be affected but also the economies of Australia, Canada and New Zealand. 20 There are also concerns about other areas of intellectual property protection such as an extension of copyright laws; international application of local laws e.g., possible extraterritorial reach of United States domestic laws; imposition of labour and environmental laws. Rather than reach a consensus as to what is the best outcome for all there is a concern that the approach that is being adopted is what is best for the United States economy.
Political considerations
ASEAN continues to be a dynamic area that cannot be ignored as a partner for trade and investment. This can be seen from the US with President Obama visiting a number ASEAN member countries including Thailand. Clearly the United States is interested in strengthening its relationship with countries in this region, especially with Myanmar since Myanmar has a policy to open the country to the world. During the last three years the Secretary of State has made a number of trips to Myanmar in what is seen as another strategy to balance the power of China which increasingly becoming an active power in this region.
ASEAN promotes cooperation between the ten country members as well as with its various trading partners. For example there is also ASEAN Plus 3 (Japan, South Korea and China) and ASEAN Plus 6 (Japan, South Korea, China, India, Australia and New Zealand). ASEAN also cooperates with ten Dialogue partners 21 plus the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Australia was the first dialogue partner with ASEAN in 1974. 22 Australia is one of the active partners and gives priority to ASEAN political issues including regional security in South East Asia especially terrorism, human trafficking and drugs due to their direct impact on Australia's stability and security. In 
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Economic cooperation within ASEAN will increase with the formation of the ASEAN Economic Community in 2015 including the ten ASEAN states. It is a multi-lateral free trade agreement and will not include the wide range of activates being negotiated as part of the TPP. Expanding this further by including its partners in ASEAN Plus 3 and ASEAN Plus 6 there will be a reduction of TBs which should lead to significantly increased trade volumes between member countries. It will encourage foreign direct investment (FDI) in the region. It is the hope of the parties that the flow of two way trade will increase leading to greater integration, diversification and economic expansion. As a result of this, the United States has shown an increasing level of interest in playing a role and strengthening its relationship with ASEAN at the economic, cultural and political level. In a number of the current cooperation agreements in Asia such as ASEAN Plus 3 and ASEAN Plus 6, the United States is not a partner. In October 2010 the Secretary of the State, Hilary Clinton, attended ASEAN Plus 6 in Hanoi, Vietnam as an observer. 26 Therefore, the US seeks to play a long term role in the economic development in Asia as it did in the 1940s to the 1970s 27 and sees the TPP as the answer. Some commentators are of the opinion that the friction between the United States and China over China's increasing influence in Asia, at the expense of the United States has led to the United States supporting a TPP under the framework of not including China. At the same time China fully supports ASEAN Plus 3 that only includes Asian countries and excludes the US. Under this cooperation framework China can enlarge its influence more than under the frame work of ASEAN Plus 6.
Mulgan notes that the media in China subscribe to the view that the TPP is a measure by the United States to encircle China, gain access to the Asian markets and gain leadership over the trade system and increase its political influence by setting regional trade rules. 28 Others disagree. For instance Solis argues China is not being excluded as it has the right, like any other APEC economy to request entry into the TPP. The issue is whether China leadership will judge TPP membership to be in their country's national interest and whether TPP members can be persuaded that China is prepared to abide by the terms of the negotiated agreement. She further argues that it is hard to understand why TPP countries would pursue the counter-productive and unfeasible goal of marginalising China which is now number two in share of world GDP and is at the centre of global supply chains. Finally she argues that "[a]scribing an anti-China objective to the TPP is not helpful on three main fronts: 1) it provides political cover to protectionist interests, who argue that they should not be asked to undertake painful economic adjustments for the sake of trade agreements driven by geopolitical concerns; 2) it sends a chilling message to prospective members, who may fear that in joining TPP they will be seen as enlisted in the anti-China camp; and 3) it will discourage China from finding points of convergence with the TPP agenda if this is seen as capitulating to an American strategy of containment". 29 A number of other key countries including Russia and the EU members are, like the United States, also interested in associating with ASEAN as can see from their push for the establishment of ASEAN Plus 8 plus EU (China, South Korea, Japan, India, Australia, New Zealand, US and Russia + EU).
If the US is successful in promoting its TPP concept it will likely have a major impact on ASEAN both in economic and strategic aspects. The concept of ASEAN Community will be less attractive to the ASEAN members who are also cooperating under TPP as it will provide access to a larger market with harmonised regulations across a number of areas.
Another key country pushing the TPP is Japan. Now that Japan has joined the TPP negotiation there will be 12 members: United States, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei, Chile, Peru, Canada, Mexico and Japan. Japan also proposes to work together with China to set up ASEAN Plus Working Group. It will work along three lines, namely trade in goods, trade in services and investment. In other words this working group is preparing for a Free Trade Agreement under ASEAN Plus. Thailand is intimately involved in the negotiations as a key member of ASEAN.
It can see there are duplications in the cooperation groups. The issue of a country joining an FTA can be a major political issue.
During the last few years Japan and China have conflicts over trade and territorial issues. First is the conflict of opinion as to whether ASEAN should run Plus 3 or Plus 6. China insists on working on ASEAN Plus 3 that is China, Japan and South Korea while Japan is promoting ASEAN Plus 6 by attaching another three countries namely Australia, New Zealand and India to balance China's power.
For Thailand ASEAN Plus 3 or 6 both provide benefit to Thailand because Thailand gives priority to ASEAN as the ASEAN model has shown to be workable in the real world. Therefore Thailand supports and cooperation in the two framework of ASEAN Plus 3 or 6 as it considers it provides good opportunities for them. ASEAN Plus 3 is the cooperation between ASEAN members and three non-ASEAN members namely: China, Japan and South Korea aims to set up ASEAN Community. It is governed by the ASEAN Plus3 Cooperation Work plan (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) (2016) (2017) . This is a long term cooperation pushing ASEAN Community by 2015. ASEAN Plus 3 cooperates in five dimensions that are politics and political stability, economic cooperation, energy and environment (sustainable development), and culture and social. The countries of ASEAN Plus 3 have a population of around 2 billion. In 2011, total trade recorded an increase of 26.2%, amounting to US$678.2 billion with exports and imports growing by 34.9% and 18.0%, respectively. Total trade with Plus Three Countries accounted for 28.4% share of ASEAN's total trade in 2011. 30 Therefore, ASEAN Plus 3 has capacity to be a strong economic bloc.
Moreover ASEAN Plus 3 continues its finance and monetary cooperation with the focus being on the implementation of the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM) and the Asian Bond Market Initiative (ABMI). 31 The currency swap is similar aspect to International Monetary Fund: IMF. This is could be the basis of an Asia Monetary fund of their own providing another option for Asian countries beside IMF. ASEAN Plus 6 is a free trade agreement using ASEAN as its centre. The agreement is comprehensive. The ASEAN Plus 6 is looking ahead to have high impact in the Asia Pacific.
Under ASEAN Plus 6, members expect to open trade on goods first as it seems the members are ready to agree and then will have more negotiation on trade on services and investment. The Thai trade volume with this cooperation bloc is 56% providing Thailand an opportunity to expand its market further. According to Miankhel, Thangavelu and Kalirajan ASEAN Plus 6 will supply a large market and encourage investment and also be link to other markets in different regions. 32 Another conflict between China and Japan is the rights over Senkaku, also known as Diaoyu Island to the Chinese. 33 The Beijing government has warned Japan to be careful of taking any action about Senkaku Island. China also says that China will not let Japan abuse its sovereignty as it did in the first half of the 20th Century. As the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island is rich in natural resources and crude oil this dispute is likely to continue.
If ASEAN members, neighbours or major trade partners of Thailand like China and Japan enter into conflict or even confront each other, it has the potential to cause the collapse or at least hinder the economic cooperation which seems to be ready to provide a bright future in Southeast Asia. China, Japan and ASEAN are the key actors for Thailand and Asia now. If violent conflict occurs, it is not only likely to stop economic/trade in Asia but will have a wider impact, particularly as the world economy, particularly that of the European Union and the United States economy has still to recover from the global financial crisis. Moreover the conflict would not only have an economic impact but it would also affect regional security. Thailand would be close to the conflict being an ASEAN member and because of its geographic location.
At the same time Tokyo has a dispute with South Korea over Takeshima/Dokdo Island. It can be seen, therefore, Japan currently does not has a smooth relationship with the neighbours. Therefore Japan cannot afford to lose out on its other interests especially in the area of trade.
These disputes over the Pacific Island were discussed in the forum of APEC as the TPP is still being negotiated at the current time.
Petri and Plummer see both the TPP and Asian negotiating tracks promising substantial, widely distributed benefits with the negotiators achieving the right balance between scope and quality. They identify four salient implications: 
The perceived benefits of TPP from the perspective of its current eleven proponents
The TPP proposal appeals to its proponents as they see benefits accruing to themselves through membership. The perceived benefits vary from country to country. Some see the benefits as so significant that they have agreed to join. Others are more circumspect and are adopting a wait and see approach. The nine countries who initially committed to membership are:
• Singapore: Singapore expects that by joining TPP it can expand into new markets such as Chile. TPP has a greater commitment to free trade than the FTAs that Singapore has entered into with New Zealand and Brunei. Singapore sees intra and inter-regional FTAs as helping to build a web of strategic linkages for Singapore within the region and with countries outside the region as they serve the broader interest of anchoring the presence of our major trading partners in Southeast Asia, and ensuring that they remain as stakeholders in Singapore by helping to sustain an open regional orientation and prevent the formation of inward-looking trading blocs. Singapore also considered that the "web of interlocking economic and strategic interests will contribute to regional stability, prosperity and security".
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• New Zealand: TPP will be providing a new market for New Zealand products. As soon as TPP comes into force many agricultural and dairy products will have zero tariffs. Consequently New Zealand has capacity to rapidly enter these markets.
• Chile: Chile plans to set up itself as a centre of investment. Moreover, Chile expects to be a hub for Latin America with enterprises using Chile as regional office and closer integration with Asia with Chile providing the Western Hemisphere's answer to Singapore. Khan argues that to realise this vision, the agreement must be flexible enough to attract additional Asian members and accommodate the continent's dynamic, fragmented production chains. 36 • Brunei: TPP agreement will require Brunei to open its market in goods and services. Also TPP will provide a conduit for Brunei's investment with the other TPP members. One of the issues that Brunei will have to resolve is that of the state owned enterprises. 37 State owned enterprises dominate the Brunei economy whereas the TPP promotes trade liberalisation and the restriction on activities of state owned enterprises.
• The US: The US will use TPP as an economic instrument in an attempt to fix its economy after the crisis and reduce its unemployment. Beside this, the FTAs that the US has made with 17 countries are much more restrictive than the TPP. This is due to the effect that the current trading partners still have limits on entry to the US particularly in relation to agricultural produce, especially sugar. 38 • Malaysia: Malaysia has been negotiating on a free trade with the US since 2006 but it is not yet concluded. Although Malaysia has FTAs with most of the TPP members, it considers that the Trans-Pacific Partnership is "a positive step towards deeper integration within the Asia Pacific region and would allow Malaysia to engage the US, which remains an important trading partner and source of investment". 39 Trade with TPP partners accounts for around a third of Malaysia's current trade. Malaysia considers that the TPP could become the primary vehicle for advancing economic cooperation and investment liberalisation in the Asia Pacific region.
• Vietnam: Vietnam proposes to invite foreign investment by using TPP and also desires the TPP to increase its value of trade through export of goods as it benefits from tariff elimination of TPP.
• Peru: By joining TPP Peru hopes to enlarge its market to Asian in line with the Peru's government policy to enhance its link to Asia. Peru sees a strong link between trade and development and sees trade liberalisation as having a positive effect on economic growth, employment and poverty reduction. "In Peru, we see how trade liberalization is directly related to the increase in our level of income and a stable economy steadily growing, which allows further improve the quality of life for all our citizens". 40 • Australia: The former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd saw membership of TPP as the goal of Australian Government as Australia seeks to integrate its economy with those of the other countries in the Asia and Pacific region. Under this policy Australia will integrate with Asia, rather than be isolated from it. Free trade in goods and services has widespread support in Australia with support from major areas of the economy such as business sector, industry, education, labour and government sector. Support is not, however, unanimous especially in times of economic uncertainty. One area of concern is the challenges that the TPP presents for Australian health and medicine policies. 41 Mexico and Canada were accepted as the 10th and 11th participants in the TPP negotiations during June 2012 and participated in the 15th Round of negotiations.
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• Canada: It is claimed that membership in the TPP would provide Canadian businesses with a chance to expand in the Australian and New Zealand markets, lock in market access to Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam, and re-engage with current FTA partners Chile, Peru and the United States in updated trade agreements. 43 The Canadian government sees the Asia-Pacific region as a priority market for Canadian businesses. 44 Canada has issues with other members of TPP like New Zealand over agriculture products such as dairy and poultry products. It is in conflict with the USA over Intellectual property right which has placed Canada on its priority watch list of Special 301 Report. [The Special 301 Report is prepared annually by the Office of the United States Trade Representative under Section 301, as amended, of the Trade Act of 1974. The reports identify TBs to US companies and products due to the intellectual property laws in other countries.] Canada remains on the GSP 301 Priority Watch List as it is still to enact its revised copyright legislation. The USA requires Canada to fully implement the WIPO Internet Treaties and strengthen its border controls in relation to the importing, exporting and transhipment of pirated and counterfeited goods. In addition the US is concerned about Canadian approval of pharmaceutical products and its trademark regime.
• Mexico: Entry to the TPP is claimed to give Mexico an opportunity to continue to diversify its exports and markets to regions with highly dynamic economies. Over the last six years the growth of Mexico's exports to Asia has surpassed 20%, primarily to Australia, New Zealand and Vietnam. Mexico considers that the TPP is currently the most important pluri-lateral trade negotiation because of its wide range of products and disciplines under negotiation and its economic importance. 45 On 21st April 2013 Japan became the 12th country to accept an invitation to join. Japan will be able to participate in the TPP negotiations once all existing members have concluded their respective domestic processes for Japan's membership. 46 • Japan continues to protect its system of agriculture and local concessions. The economic devastation from the Fukushima earthquake has resulted in Japan deciding to defer consideration of membership of TPP. It is highly likely to join because of political and economic necessity. Opposition to Japan's membership is likely to come from the US because of Japan's protection of its agriculture and automotive industries. 47 The current TPP members (11 members) have requested other APEC members to join TPP including South Korea and Indonesia. Both of these countries are considering whether the country will really benefit from membership. The United States supports TPP as its sees trade benefits in short-term and long-term, especially where it can impose its rules on others. In his 2012 Section 301 Report, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) reaffirmed that an important part of the mission of his office is to "support and implement the Administration's commitment to aggressively protect American intellectual property overseas". 48 Infringement of intellectual property rights (IPR) is considered to undermine key US comparative advantages in innovation and creativity, to the detriment of American businesses and workers. "Because fostering innovation and creativity is essential to our prosperity, competitiveness, and the support of an estimated 40 million US jobs that directly or indirectly rely on IPR-intensive industries, USTR works to protect American inventiveness and creativity with all the tools of US trade policy." 49 Kirk sees the Trans-Pacific Partnership as a key initiative through which the United States seeks to advance the multi-faceted US trade and investment interests in the Asia-Pacific region by negotiating an ambitious, 21st-century regional trade agreement with like-minded countries with the goal of creating a platform for integration across the region. 50 It is emphatic that the Trans-Pacific Partnership 'will include strong standards for the protection and enforcement of IPR in the 21st Century.' 51 It is interesting that whilst most trading partners emphasise cooperation between the members, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) clearly sees US trade policy as protecting its industry. This can be seen in current concerns with Canada over Intellectual Property Rights in a number of areas and with New Zealand in relation to pharmaceutical products, 52 and lamb and beef exports. 53 Some US observers have expressed concern that future trade agreements, including any agreement reached under the TPP framework, will be difficult to negotiate in the absence of trade promotion authority (TPA) "which allows the President to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements that are to receive expedited congressional consideration (i.e., limited debate and committee consideration, no amendments, and an up or down vote) as long as the President adheres to specific deadlines and consultation requirements". 54 Citing the US Trade Act of 2012 as an example, 55 Flynn, Baker, Kaminski, and Koo, see the current TPP negotiations as part of a US trend over the last quarter century to aggressively promote the goal of harmonising international IP laws in its own image. 56 They claim that the US, negotiating process is creating problems in terms of balance, inclusion, and democratic process. 57 They consider that the inclusion of substantive intellectual property provisions in the TPP agreement poses threats to the coherence of the international intellectual property legal system including WIPO and TRIPS. 58 In fact, they see the whole US negotiating position as casting considerable doubt on the success of the negotiations. He admitted that while the Government can see significant opportunities from participation in this Agreement, they are also conscious of the need to retain control over the setting of domestic policy in a range of areas. 61 In other words Australia is cognisant of the need to retain sovereignty over its domestic policy.
Expectations for TPP
The TPP negotiations have been delegated to 20 working groups comprises with market access, technical barriers to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, rules of origin, customs cooperation, investment, services, financial services, telecommunications, e-commerce, business mobility, government procurement, competition, intellectual property, labour, environment, capacity building, trade remedies, legal and institutional and horizontal issues. 62 Under the so called 'horizontal issues', there are another five groups that cover rules harmonisation/regulatory coherence, small and medium enterprises (SMEs), trade competition, transparency and development. All of these were carried over from APEC which as a grouping of economies promoting common interests by consensus rather than a trading bloc was not in the position to negotiate such a far reaching treaty as the TPP.
One issue of concern is that the United States desires to maintain its existing FTAs and negotiate individual FTAs with new partners. Australia, New Zealand and Brunei propose that the next round of negotiations should use the same principles and same standard for all partners. In other words the United States wants to maintain the benefits it has negotiated with its existing Agreements on a bilateral basis and rather than all of the parties having the same rules on a multilateral basis. This way it can maximise the benefits to the United States economy by improving its export potential and potentially limiting the competition from imports.
If the negotiations follow the United States proposal it seems that the United States will act as the centre and the TPP will become the United States standard.
In light of all of these factors it will be interesting to see whether TPP actually succeeds. Whether one or other or both survive depends on the ability of the parties to agree on conditions of membership that are perceived to benefit each of its members.
Thai's vision toward TPP: advantages and disadvantages
Thailand is already an integral part to negotiators for the RCEP. Whether or not Thailand should join the TPP is a vexed question.
The factors that Thailand must consider in response to the invitation to join TPP have a number of dimensions. On a similar economic scale to the TPP is the RCEP in which Thailand is closely involved. For Thailand the idea of TPP and RCEP have arisen at similar time and have some common features.
The advantage to Thailand is that the RCEP is economy-based in comparison with the TPP which is more broadly based as it potentially includes political and security cooperation. There is the distinct possibility that the TPP could result in some loss of sovereignty on the part of Thailand and the other members as the agreements under the TPP take precedence over local laws and domestic laws of other countries have application in a different jurisdiction. As stated above, this issue has also been recognised as an issue by the Australian government. 63 Another advantage to Thailand in preferring the RCEP is that it is based initially on Thailand's existing trading partners with whom it already has FTAs, namely ASEAN Plus 6. A multilateral approach with common rules is considered to be of greater benefit to the parties than is a complex series of bilateral FTAs each with their own set of rules. It is certainly more streamlined.
Yoon sums up the Thai views on the TPP and the RCEP in an opinion piece in The Nation newspaper, whilst both share some basic objectives -trade liberalisation and economic integration the opponents are very concerned about the political implications of being part of this 'higher level' of integration. 64 They are concerned about the potential adverse effects on Thailand of tighter rules on intellectual property rights and patent registration as well as the potential loss of sovereignty. Advocates, on the other hand focus on the fact that Thailand should become part of the push for regional economic integration as it will become an inevitable trend for the future.
There is a concern that the US and China with their support of TPP and RCEP respectively may represent a new point of conflict between the US and China, each trying to form economic cooperation groupings in Southeast and East Asia to promote their relevant economic interests, which in turn certainly carries political and security implications.
Thailand has to consider the circumstances carefully especially if every APEC member joins TPP. Thailand cannot afford to stand alone. Thailand has for centuries been a trading nation and is dependent on international trade for its economic wellbeing. If all of its major trading partners join TPP and Thailand does not it could disadvantage Thailand in a number of markets, especially where it does not already have a FTA. As the outcomes of the current negotiations are confidential to the parties neither the progress nor the content of the negotiations is known.
It is considered, therefore, that Thailand should join the negotiation table for the next round. It means Thailand does not need to agree with the agreement at the first instance. If there is not agreement among parties the TPP will not eventuate.
The dangers of not being part of the negotiations early can be summed up by using the example of Canada: Canada had the chance in 2005 to join the nascent grouping, but chose not to. Now that it wished to be party to the negotiations its prospective partners must determine Canada's suitability to join negotiations already in progress. At least two parties have trade issues with Canada. New Zealand is opposed to Canada's attempts to maintain existing dairy supply management. In 2010, US officials declined to support Canada's case. 65 They were finally accepted as partners in 2012. Clearly the longer Thailand waits to enter the negotiations the harder will be entry. The key areas of conflict are likely to be in the area of Intellectual Property, particularly in relation to generic pharmaceuticals and copyright law, where the requirements are likely to be more rigorous than those negotiated under the WTO.
If Thailand joins the negotiations it can use its participation to drive a proposal and bargain in some sensitive issues that are current concerns. Thailand is particularly concerned about the service sector, IP and environment standards. The current proposals by the US in these areas will have a major adverse impact on Thailand if it decided to join.
For the service sector, the US proposes the Negative List Approach. 66 It means that is services that are not placed in the list, members have to open their borders and allow organisations to enter and compete in carrying out such services.
TPP countries are discussing elements for a labour chapter that includes commitments on labour rights protection and mechanisms to ensure cooperation, coordination, and dialogue on labour issues of mutual concern. They agree on the importance of coordination to address the challenges of the 21st-century workforce through bilateral and regional cooperation on "workplace practices to enhance workers' wellbeing and employability, and to promote human capital development and high-performance workplaces. 67 In addition it looks at both exception clauses and the possibility of positive obligations to ensure environmental protection, as well as the potential effects on, and requirements for, agriculture and industry". 68 Inappropriate action on any of these issues can, in fact become an obstacle to trade and adversely affect the economies of much of the world. Members do not necessarily agree with the US on these issues. So what would that mean for Thailand?
If Thailand joins the negotiation it can reinforce the view of the some other ASEAN members, namely Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam who have not agreed with the United States on the issues mentioned.
Moreover Thailand can be one of the countries who can negotiate to ensure that the agreements do not apply overly strict rules and standards that will, in fact, reduce competition. At the same time it can be a pathway for other ASEAN members like Indonesia and Philippines to more easily decide to join the TPP. However, for Thailand the priority is ASEAN as its sees greater economic, politics, security and regional benefits in being a trading partner with China and its ASEAN partners than with the United States.
On the face of it whether or not TPP succeeds there might not be much impact to Thailand as nine countries that are joining TPP are either members of ASEAN (Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam) and have an FTA with Thailand (Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Chile and Peru).
However, the US is still the important market for Thailand and the other ASEAN members. According to the 2011 data of Executive Office of the President of the United State Trade Representative, the US remains the largest world's economy and largest goods and services importer and exporter of the world. 69 If TPP functions, Thailand will lose opportunity to join the biggest market community in the world.
Beside this, Thailand will lose US market share to Malaysia and Vietnam who are competitors to Thailand in areas such as such as electronics, auto parts, computer spare parts, foot wear, garment and textiles. At the moment Thailand is competitive but if TPP grants additional concessions to Malaysia and Vietnam this may significantly disadvantage the Thai economy.
